

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00198 01 OF 02 181923 Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O P 181816 Z MAY 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1992

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0198

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 18, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT
PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, FRIDAY,
MAY 18, 1973.

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE
SETTING FORTH SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION IN SUPPORT OF
THOSE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN THE
LIGHT OF THE TASKS FACING OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE DISCUSSIONS ALREADY HELD THAT BOTH
SIDES PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF
THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK OUT AN
AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST BE BASED ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE, RECORDED IN THE SOVIET- AMERICAN DOCUMENTS.

THE MAY 15, 1973 STATEMENT OF THE U. S. DELEGATION
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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00198 01 OF 02 181923 Z

JUSTLY NOTED THAT BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT AN AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST CONTAIN PROVISIONS ON LIMITING LAND- BASED ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS. THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE IN RESPECT TO THESE LIMITATIONS HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN DETAIL, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE APRIL 12, 1973 STATEMENT OF THE USSR DELEGATION.

AS FOR THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS, THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE PROVIDES THAT IT MUST BE LIMITED BY AGREED LEVELS.

IN STUDYING THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH BY THE U. S. SIDE ON MAY 8, 1973, WE ARE PUZZLED AS TO WHAT FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS LIE AT THE BASIS OF THE AGGREGATE CEILING, SPECIFIED BY THE U. S. SIDE.

IF SOLUTION OF THE TASKS FACING US IS APPROACHED OBJECTIVELY, THEN ONE CANNOT FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THAT FOR A CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION IN AN AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN FULL, INCLUDING THE PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, EXISTENCE ON THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES OF BASES AND OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS.

FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY MORE THAN ONCE SET FORTH WITH SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS ITS POSITION CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OF THE SIDES, SUBJECT TO LIMITATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FUTURE UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN ADDITION TO LAND- BASED ICBMS, SLBMS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WITHIN THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ALL TYPES OF MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR- DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

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PAGE 03 SALT T 00198 01 OF 02 181923 Z

ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS CARRIER- BASED DELIVERY AIRCRAFT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT OF ATTACK CARRIERS.

OF COURSE, IF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WERE LOCATED ONLY ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORIES OF THE SIDES,

THEN THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING THEM COULD BECOME SUBSTANTIAL-
LY SIMPLER. THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOT THE CASE. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS,
FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ANY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF ONE OF THE SIDES,
WHICH, SUPPORTED BY CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF
THIRD COUNTRIES, ARE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY
OF THE OTHER SIDE, HAVE A DIRECT INFLUENCE UPON THE OVERALL
STRATEGIC SITUATION. THE SITUATION IS IN NO WAY CHANGED BY
THE FACT THAT THE ABOVE- MENTIONED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE LOCATED
AT BASES SITUATED ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES UNDER
SOME MILITARY- POLITICAL AGREEMENT OR OTHER.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE CANNOT BE EMBODIED IN AN AGREEMENT ON MORE C
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PAGE 01 SALT T 00198 02 OF 02 181926 Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O P 181816 Z MAY 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WAHDC IMMEDIATE 1993
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0198

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

ANOTHER DEPEND NOT ONLY UPON THEIR QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITA-
TIVE CHARACTERISTICS, BUT ALSO UPON THEIR DEPLOYMENT AND
THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE
SOVIET SIDE REALIZES THAT THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE
ABOVE- MENTIONED SYSTEMS IS NOT AN EASY ONE. HOWEVER,
THE PROPOSAL FOR A PHASED SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM DEMONSTRATES
THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAYS FOR
SOLVING IT. MOREOVER, WE HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT THE SOVIET
SIDE IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER VARIANTS, TOO, OF A PHASED
SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

WE HOPE THAT THE U. S. DELEGATION WILL AGAIN CONSIDER
WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A PHASED
WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND WILL
SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE WAYS FOR ITS SOLUTION ON THE
BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY
OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. JOHNSON

SECRET
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00198
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: XGDSI
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730549/aaaajmtm.tel
Line Count: 178
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 20 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <19-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 980224
Subject: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 18, 1973
TAGS: PARM
To: MOSCOW
NATO
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005